WORKING PAPERS
Strategic Sacrifice: The Political Economy of Forced Labor in Premodern States
Job Market Paper
Premodern rulers long imposed onerous forced labor on their subjects, causing flight and mortality. Why would rulers deplete the very population upon which they depended to sustain their states? I argue that such population loss reflected a strategic sacrifice: unable to prevent the demographic consequences of forced labor, rulers accepted meaningful losses as the cost of imposing heavier demands on those who remained. A simple model clarifies the theory’s logic, yielding two implications that I evaluate with evidence from the mining mita, a forced-labor institution in colonial Peru. First, difference-in-differences estimates show that the mining mita induced substantial population decline, while a systematic review of official records supports strategic sacrifice as the best interpretation of this result. Second, an analysis of labor quotas reveals that demands were higher where indigenous peasants faced greater opportunity costs of flight. Strategic sacrifice thus offers an explanation for the severe demographic costs of premodern forced labor.
From Flight to Fight: State Building and the Transformation of Popular Resistance
Draft available upon request
Rebellion occupies a central place in the study of politics under autocratic rule. Yet rebellions often fail to materialize despite the grievances that might warrant them—why? Contrary to accounts centered on collective action or the feasibility of rebellion, I argue that whether grievances manifest as revolt depends on the availability of exit, which rulers can shape. Where rulers possess the capacity to restrict exit, they may undertake state-building reforms to close off that option, redirecting some who would otherwise have fled toward rebellion. I develop a model to illustrate this logic, yielding two implications that I evaluate using evidence from early Bourbon Peru. First, descriptive evidence and a staggered difference-in-differences design suggest that a reform restricting indigenous tributaries’ ability to escape colonial demands increased rebellion. Second, a systematic review of historical records shows that the Spanish Crown’s decision-making reflected a strategic calculus: officials recognized the risk of rebellion yet maintained the reforms, implicitly accepting localized unrest. These findings show how state building can transform the repertoire of popular resistance.
WORKS IN PROGRESS
Hidden Subjects: How Rugged Terrain Constrains State Extraction
How does rugged terrain affect state extraction? This paper argues that difficult geography constrains state control through a neglected mechanism: it enables subjects to hide from officials responsible for assessing tax obligations. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence from colonial Peru, it shows that indigenous communities in more rugged areas faced lower per capita tribute burdens, with historical records providing direct evidence of subjects concealing themselves during tax enumerations.
Commodity Booms and the Politics of Abolition: Evidence from Republican Peru
With Daniel Baquero and Iván San Miguel
What determines when governments abolish oppressive institutions? We argue that commodity booms can trigger intra-elite conflict, giving excluded factions incentives to mobilize mass support through policy concessions. We develop this argument in the context of republican Peru, where opposition leader Ramón Castilla abolished indigenous tribute and slavery to rally popular backing for his rebellion against the guano-enriched government.